




# AIR WAR COLLEGE

## RESEARCH REPORT


INCREASING ARMY NATIONAL GUARD RESPONSIBILITY,  
IS THE NATION AT RISK?

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AIR UNIVERSITY  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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INCREASING ARMY NATIONAL GUARD RESPONSIBILITY,  
IS THE NATION AT RISK?

by

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY  
IN  
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM  
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: LTC Dan Bozeman

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Increasing Army National Guard Responsibility, Is the Nation at Risk? AUTHOR: Kerry G. Denson, Lt Col, WIARNG.

The world is in one of the fastest paced rates of change experienced since the end of Word War II. The Warsaw Pact and communism as we understood them are undergoing fundamental changes and may even cease to exist. The American public and its representatives, the Congress have declared the end of the Cold War and are ready to dismantle the US Military and declare a "peace dividend" to counter the staggering national budget deficit. Traditionally this has been the American reaction when a threat no longer existed. The Army National Guard today already represents almost one half of the Total Army combat units. Are these Guard units ready? If they are needed can they respond in a timely manner, trained and equipped? The answers to these questions are yes, if we have increased warning times, the Guard is filled with the equipment its units require, adequate Full Time Unit Support personnel are resourced, and more efficient use of training time is implemented; the Army National Guard can fill an increasing role of national defense with out substantially increasing risk to national security. The cost of maintaining the Guard will increase, but it will be less expensive than maintaining the same units on active duty.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lt Col Kerry G. Denson, WIARNG, is a 1990 graduate of the Air War College. He has a BA in Business Administration from Milton College. He is a Master Army Aviator having over 8800 hours which include over 1200 Combat Hours. He has flown the UH-1H, AH-1S, U-21 and C-12. His assignments have included two tours in Viet Nam, two years as an Instructor Pilot to include one assignment in Flight Standards. He joined the Wisconsin Army National Guard and served as the Operations Officer of an Assault Helicopter Company becoming its Executive Officer and then its Commanding Officer. The unit was reorganized into an Attack Helicopter Battalion and he commanded it for over four years. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officers Basic Course, the Infantry Officer Advance Course and the US Army Command and General Staff College.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Every writer and speech maker prefaces his work with, these are exciting, changing, fast moving times. These time worn statements have probably been proving more true in the preceding three years then anytime in our recent history. We are witnessing a major political shift on a world scale. The political balance has been a contest of East-West, democracy-communism, US-USSR, Nato-Warsaw Pact, or any other measuring device you care to use. The bottom line has been that since the end of WWII almost the entire world has been polarized into one camp or the other. Third world countries fought their wars, usually receiving training and hardware from one or the other of the world super powers, the US or the USSR. By aiding these countries it was hoped that they would join our camp and add another member to our team. Obviously there have been some excursions from this, Iran-Iraq being the most recent.

What we are witnessing however is that one team, the USSR, seems to be saying that they don't want to play anymore. Or, that they are changing the rules.

The Soviets no longer desire to compete only in the military arena. They have demonstrated their change in strategy by releasing their iron grip on the Eastern European countries they held. They have moved some of their military units further back into the USSR, some very strategic units, Bridging and Tac Air Assets.

They have demonstrated a new cooperative spirit by signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and appear to be negotiating seriously in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Conventional Forces in Europe Reduction (CFE) talks.

They have not, militarily, demonstrated a significant reduction in capability. They have however said their intent is to reduce capabilities, hence START and CFE, to lower world tension.

Politics and military capability are obviously closely related. If one has an aggressive, expanding political strategy then one needs the military capability to back it up. If the political aggressive side has a fundamental change of political objectives will they need such a large military force? Will the other side need as large of a capability to defend if the threat is diminished?

Where we are at right now is that the USSR has made significant political changes, however, they have not made significant military changes. They have said that their intent of military power and projections has changed.



They desire to reduce it and are doing things that appear to make good their stated intent.

Politics must lead military compatibility. If their politics have changed they may actually lose control of much of their allied military capability, possibly its loyalty.

As they change their political thinking, they may need more of their Soviet military capability for internal order, Armenia and Azerbaijan being two current examples.

Meanwhile, the United States is faced with a staggering deficit that the people and congress have finally decided must be dealt with. It is foreseen in the eyes of the United States citizen that the cold war is over, thus we can dismantle or reduce the large expensive DOD structure and use the "peace dividend" to pay off the deficit.

Today it seems people believe in an adequate defense, versus a strong defense. The "just enough" theory, if the perceived threat is reduced then it is logical to reduce the size and cost of the defense. The country still desires to have military capability for contingencies if needed, but until then put the capability in the "Militia". This has been our historical and cultural response to peace as a nation.

This country was founded by people who were fleeing countries that had large standing armies. Those armies were paid for by the taxes levied on the people and then used to oppress them by the rulers.

The colonist had no illusions about the need for a common defense, thus, they formed the first units of the militia on December 13, 1636 by authority of the General Court at Boston. Virginia, Maryland and Connecticut soon followed suit and organized their own regiments. The mission of the militia was to defend the settlement and the colony in case of attack. Each militiaman was required to provide his own weapon and attend drills several times per month.(1-67) Thus was born this nations break with established tradition, that of a standing army. It was substituted with the citizen soldier having a deep philosophical, as well as, economic impact on the character of the emerging nation.

"The militia and the peacetime regular army that replaced it never behaved like the professional soldiers of European style. This can be attributed to the founding fathers suspicion of the large standing armies and of anyone that had that much control upon the country as a whole. It could probably best be summarized that the intent of the Founding Fathers was to insure that the military professionals of the newly formed America's were citizens first with all the rights enjoyed by other citizens, and not an elite class of nobles or professionals as was the traditional European style." (2-18)

Since the citizen became the soldier, he has had only one mission, the common defense of the settlement or the colony. He answered the economic problem, citizen volunteers that bring their own weapons and arms. Thus, deep in our history as a nation we began a tradition of the citizen soldier, ready when needed, but not a tax burden to his fellow citizens.

It soon became apparent that the citizen soldier as organized and self equipped could not provide all of the protection required, especially as military technology changed. Cavalry and artillery units were formed with voluntary militia, ie; tax funded military equipment but all volunteer members who drilled and gained effective unit cohesion. Usually such men came from the higher income levels than the standing regulars. (1-4)

The first large scale call of the militia was the Civil War. When war broke out the Army of the United States consisted of no more than 1108 officers and 15,129 enlisted men. Hardly anyone expected that the Union Army would expand to over 2,500,000 and the Confederate Army would reach over 1,000,000. (3-97)

When all of the state militia units reported for federal duty they had to be almost completely reequipped. Each unit reported with its own multitude of different uniforms, differing models and calibers of weapons and its own organization. Logistical support was almost impossible. It was not until 1903 with the Dick Act that the Federal Government came into the picture on a regular basis. The act established procedures for a more direct role in organizing, equipping and training the National Guard as it was now known.(1-67)

During WWI the National Guard provided over 17 divisions, about 40 per cent of the entire American Expeditionary Force.

WWII mobilized every existing unit in the National Guard. The Guard offered 18 combat divisions and over 300,000 men between September 16, 1940 and October 6, 1941. This more than doubled the size of the existing Army.

Korea saw two combat divisions assigned to the theater, two divisions assigned to Europe and four additional mobilized but held as a contingency in the the United States.(1-69)

During the Viet Nam war the National Command Authority decided not to call up any large National Guard units. This was not due to their readiness or their willingness to fight, but was considered to politically sensitive to mobilize units of men from communities to fight in a generally unpopular war.

Historically this nation has depended on a standing army force backed up by a ready and willing militia, the National Guard. The Guard accomplished all of the fundamental ideals that the Founding Fathers and the citizens wanted to attain, adequate defense, economical in nature, and made up of and commanded by fellow citizens.

The current era of National Guard growth is the pattern this country has followed after each conflict or period of increased tensions, a return to peace, a reduction of the standing force and a return to its militia heritage.

The remainder of this paper will discuss readiness, critical questions and options and choices available to the Guard. First we need to explore the historical precedent for the Guard and take a look at its structure and posture today.

## CHAPTER II

### WHAT CONSTITUTES TODAY'S NATIONAL GUARD?

The National Guard receives its authority from Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 and 16 of the United States Constitution, which says in part:

The Congress shall have the power....

(15) To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;

(16) To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority for the training of the militia according to the discipline prescribed by the Congress; (4-Art. I)

This authority gave the states the right to organize units, appoint officers and train to the discipline set forth by the Congress. That discipline has resulted in what today we know as the "Total Force Policy".

The Total Force Policy was stated by Melvin Laird, then the Secretary of Defense, in a statement in August of 1970. He stated that the increased reliance on the National Guard and other reserve components for immediate availability necessitated this change. He stated that "The Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces..." (5-58)

This concept of "Total Force" allowed the active forces to reduce manpower and concentrate on modernization. With the decision to move to an all volunteer force in the 1970's significant changes to the equation were apparent. It required the Guard to fill global missions which it had not done in the past. This change was due to the reduction of the active force's force structure resulting in the growth of the Army National Guard (ARNG).

The Army National Guard currently has 453,854 members in 10 divisions, 18 separate brigades, three medical brigades, four armored cavalry regiments, two special operations aviation battalions and 17 major headquarters. This represents 32 percent of the total Army's strength and 43 percent of its combat units.

The Army National Guard provides 100 percent of the TOW Light Antitank Infantry Battalions, 100 percent of the Infantry Scout Troops, 100 percent of the Heavy Lift Helicopter Companies, 46 percent of the Pathfinder units, 73 percent of the Infantry Battalions, 57 percent of the Armored Cavalry Regiments, 49 percent of the Field Artillery Battalions, 47 percent of the Armored Battalions and 47 percent of the Mechanized Infantry Battalions. (6-76)

The Guard is now better equipped than it ever has been in its history, more than \$1.6 Billion worth of new and displaced equipment was distributed to the ARNG in FY 85 and a similar amount in FY 86. New equipment includes the M1 Tank, the M2 Bradely Fighting Vehicle, Improved TOW vehicles, Fire Support Team Vehicles, M198 Howitzers, Chaparral Air Defense Systems, AH-1S and AH-64 Attack Helicopters and UH-60 Utility Helicopters. (7-32)

Much of the equipment was received new, direct from the manufacturer, the ARNG is no longer the poor cousin who receives only obsolete or old equipment hand-me-downs from a benevolent active force. The equipment is distributed



directly to the units, not pooled or warehoused for mobilization. It is used by the units to train on and practice their wartime mission. They maintain it using Guard members and the full time support work force.

The Guard members are an all volunteer force who join the Guard for the same motivations as those who join the active forces, a sense of adventure, patriotism, economics and educational benefits.

When they attend their Basic Combat Training and Advanced Individual Training they do so right along with their active counterpart. The Guardsman then returns to his home unit of assignment whereas the active soldier will be assigned to an active unit. The quality of the force that the Guard attracts is quite impressive, more than 90 percent have high school diplomas, not included in this figure are those who have enlisted while still in school and will attend training after graduation, if they are included the percentage is even higher. Almost 9 percent of the enlisted force has some college and approximately 5 percent are college graduates.

The Guardsman trains with his unit one weekend a month and for 15 days of Annual Training (AT) each year for a total of 39 days annually. This is the only time available to him to maintain and improve his military skills. There are provisions for flight crew members to spend an additional 48 days per year training through the Additional Flight Training Period (AFTP) program. This is necessary for them due to the

amount of knowledge, skill and proficiency they must maintain.

The Guardsman then provides the Army with a trained soldier for a mere 39 days of wages per year. Actually the real cost is even less than the 39 days per year because the soldier receives only his base pay and does not receive any of the family benefits or expenses such as housing allowance and medical care for his family, thus not requiring post hospitals, schools and all of the attendant overhead associated with the active soldier. Additionally if the soldier remains in the Guard for twenty years he is eligible for a military retirement when he reaches age sixty. His retirement will be based on a point system, one point for each drill period or each day of active duty or AT performed. Each point will have a value based on the highest rank held by the soldier. For example, take an E-7, his retirement points are worth .12057 cents each. If he earned 2500 points during his career, an average twenty year career, his monthly retirement annuity would be approximately \$301.00 at age sixty. ( $2500 \times .12057 \text{ cents} = \$301.00$ ) (3-28) If he were to retire from the Guard at age 45 he would receive nothing for fifteen years until he reached age sixty. His active duty counterpart, same rank and age, would begin collecting \$880.16 each month beginning the month after he retired. The active duty soldier would accumulate 7300 points in a twenty year career, one point each day. ( $365 \text{ days} \times 20 \text{ years} = 7300 \text{ points}$ ) ( $7300 \text{ points} \times .12057 \text{ cents} = \$880.16$ )

The savings in retirement alone are readily apparent with the above simple example. If both men were to live to age 72, the national average, and assuming no increases in military retirement, the active retiree would collect \$285,172 versus \$43,344 for the Guardsman. The difference for just one soldier is almost a quarter of a million dollars. When this is applied to over 400,000 Guardsmen the savings or avoidance cost become very significant in the budgetary process.

Monthly payroll is the single largest cost to most Army units. The personnel cost to operate an active duty mechanized battalion for one year is calculated at \$13.21 million versus \$3.06 million for the same Guard unit. The total cost of the active battalion, including personnel cost annually is calculated at \$16.33 million for the active unit versus \$3.75 million for the Guard unit. (9-29)

The cost is less for other reasons as well, some of the Guard members will be gained from active duty and a lower operating tempo will reduce the cost of fuel and repair parts. The fact remains that 80 percent of the active units cost are wages alone and these are normally calculated to be four to five times less in the Guard unit of the same size and rank structure.

The Army National Guard (ARNG) then has been given the preponderance of the reserve component combat missions for two reasons, its excellent track record on performance and readiness and the manner in which the Guard is mobilized versus the United States Army Reserve (USAR).

The National Guard can only be mobilized by the President, by unit. If he wants to use the Guard, he must take the entire unit, he can not take individuals and use them as "fillers" for active units. This is in consonance with the concept of the militia being raised and trained by the states under the officers appointed by the governors.

This is one of the primary differences between the National Guard and the United States Army Reserve. (USAR). It maintains not only units but the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR is a pool of trained reservists who are not assigned to units and is made up of many Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). The President can activate the IRR as needed. These individuals are then used by the active forces to fill shortfalls of those MOS's in the active units. They are then used as "fillers". The same procedure can be done with a particular MOS that is needed by mobilizing only that MOS out of the Reserve units. An example might be MOS 63B, Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic. If the active army were short 2500 of these during a crisis they could activate the IRR for MOS 63B. If that only yielded 1900 they could activate only the 63B's out of selected

Reserve units, selected in that they have not been targeted for activation as a unit. This selective activation by MOS would fill the 600 man short fall after the IRR resources had been exhausted.

The different means of mobilization has put mostly combat units in the Guard. The Guard has 29 percent of the Total Force in personnel but is 39 percent of the deploying forces during mobilization. The active force is 47 percent of the Total Force but only 30 percent of the deploying force during mobilization. The ARNG has 46 percent of the total Army combat units, only 2 percent less than the active component. Stated another way, about one-half of the Army's combat forces are in the Guard.(11-3)

The USAR has been allocated mostly combat support (CBT SPT) and combat service support (CBT SVC SPT) type units and missions. It has 42 percent of the CBT SPT and CBT SVC SPT units of the total force, the active component has 38 percent and the ARNG the remaining 20 percent.(11-4) The reasoning for this is partially that the USAR can be used to fill out active units when needed from the IRR or mobilize by MOS on an as needed basis. Unit cohesion is not deemed as necessary in these units as it is in combat units.

Another important reason for maintaining unit integrity in the Guard units is its dual mission. The Guard has a dual obligation, to the state as well as the federal government's command authority. During peacetime the Guard is under state control as set forth in the United States Constitution.

The governor of each state is the Commander-in-Chief of his states Guard units. Although he has the control he has almost none of the fiscal responsibility. All of the equipment required to fulfill the federal combat mission is furnished, maintained and operated with federal funds. All of the personnel, Guardsmen and full time support people, are paid for by the federal government.

The state does have a few expenses. When an armory, the building used to house and train a unit, is initially constructed it is paid for at a 75/25 ratio. The federal government pays for 75 percent of the cost and the state the remaining 25 percent. The state must furnish the land on which to construct the armory, however, most states ask the local community to donate it. Once the armory is completed the state must pay approximately 50 percent of the operating and maintenance cost of the building. The building is, after five years, deeded over to the state as real property.

The financial gain to the state for having a Guard unit is approximately 20:1. For each state dollar spent/invested, the federal government will spend twenty dollars in the form of pay to the Guardsmen and full time work force, building construction, federally funded building improvements and purchase of local supplies and services.

The magnitude of the return is proportional to the size of the units in the state. Wisconsin is a fairly typical state in Guard size, about 10,000 members. In 1987 it received approximately \$100,000,000 from the federal

government versus a state expenditure of \$20,300,000. The economist usually ripple that through the local economy at least five times. The ripple effect assumes that each dollar will be spent at least five times in the economic community in which it was introduced. A simple example, the Guardsman spends his Guard pay to put a deck on his house. The builder uses that money to pay his hired help, who spends it at the grocery store who spends it to pay the electrician to fix his refrigeration, etc. The net result is that the \$100 million is spent and taxed as if it were \$500 million. Wisconsin averages 8 percent taxation, sales tax and income tax, thus the \$20.3 million in state money returns \$40 million in tax revenue.

Most states eagerly seek additional Guard units. Communities often attempt to outbid each other with choice real estate, larger tracts of land than required by law and writing campaigns to their legislatures in an attempt to attract a unit.

Another advantage of having Guard units in the state is the use and security it provides to the state government. The governor has the use of the Guard if he declares a "state of emergency". It may then be used for relief from natural disaster or to maintain civil order. The latter has been invoked in the case of large scale strikes of public employees such as police or fire departments. In 1978 the Wisconsin State Correctional Systems employees went on strike in eighteen state correctional facilities. Over 6000 Guardsmen responded, previously trained in this dual mission

because the state had been forewarned that such an incident may occur. The prisons were operated without serious incident, in fact the general consensus of the prisoners was that their "new" wardens treated them like men, not objects. (12-24)

The cost to the state in these circumstances is the daily cost of each Guardsman's wage, paid at the military rate for his rank, time in service, etc. All federal equipment used must be paid for by the state to the federal government at a rate determined by DOD and updated periodically. Basically the state pays for actual fuel used and a nominal fee for O&M for miles or hours accrued per unit of equipment.

As quoted from then governor Lee Dreyfus of Wisconsin to the Wisconsin National Guard Officers Association at Oshkosh, WI in April, 1982,

The National Guard is one of the best deals any governor gets. He has at his disposal thousands of trained, disciplined soldiers and all of their well maintained equipment available to him at no cost unless he uses it. If he needs it he only has to pay for what he used. (13-2)

In 1987 the National Guard was involved in 464 state call ups involving 34,668 personnel, spending 144,656 mandays paid for by their respective states. (4-106)

Even with this dual mission there is no conflict between the state and federal command authority. If the president activates, mobilizes, the National Guard he has precedent over the governor. Both the governor and the president then have a vested interest in the readiness of their force.



## CHAPTER III

### READINESS

The Guard is certainly an integral part of the Total Force, Active Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard, comprising almost half of the Army combat force. Can we then count on this force to be ready if called upon to conduct its federal mission, combat in defense of the nation? This is a many faceted question and the National Guard readiness is a key element that must be addressed if we are to arrive at our answer.

. Readiness is measured in many ways, personnel strength, MOS qualification, equipment assigned, equipment readiness and actual testing of units under simulated combat conditions.

The Guard is manned at nearly 100 percent strength. In FY 88 the actual strength of Guard was 94 percent. While the Guard did not meet its objective in FY 88 between 1981 and 1989 it increased its strength by 17.6 percent of its war time requirements. During this same period the Active Army had a negative 1.2 percent change in its war time requirements. (15-38) Many states, Texas and Mississippi to name two, are manned at over 100 percent. This overall

strength is important because it indicates the grass roots support for the Guard. The Guard plans to increase its strength to 110 percent across the board by FY 92 (14-9). It appears that the goal may be very attainable, especially if the Army reduces active spaces by 30,000 each year for the next few years.

The active duty reduction works two ways. First many of those getting off of active duty will join the Guard. Second, the pool of 18 year olds is getting smaller and that a certain percentage of all eighteen year olds are disposed to joining the military. If the Active Army needs 30,000 less each year those eighteen year olds will be available to the Guard.

The experience level in the Guard units is a factor seldom examined or taken into account when measuring readiness. It is not uncommon to find platoons in infantry units in which over half the members have been platoon members for over five years. Most ARNG units have experience factors that average ten years in the same unit. This stability greatly enhances unit cohesion.

Readiness is directly related to training. The ARNG was 93.2 percent MOS qualified in FY88. (15-46) Included in that 6.8 percent who were not MOS qualified were those awaiting to attend training, those who joined during their senior year of high school and will not attend Basic Training until they graduate. The ARNG also offers the split training option, this allows the soldier to attend Basic Training after high school but then return in time to start college

and not attend his Advanced Individual Training until after his freshman year of college. If the soldier had joined the Guard six months prior to high school graduation this program could have him in the Guard but non-MOS qualified for up to 18 months. The positive side of the program is that it is a real incentive, allowing the citizen Guard membership without interrupting his civilian education.

A key indicator of readiness is the equipment assigned and the readiness of it. The ARNG has benefited from a sizable markup in the equipment assigned. The value of the assigned equipment has increased by 9 percent in just one year, FY 87 to FY 88. (15-116) The units reporting C-3 or higher based on equipment on hand has risen from 56 percent in FY 83 to 86 percent in FY 87. The units reporting that equipment readiness status as C-3 or higher has risen from 79 percent in FY 83 to 85 percent in FY 88. (10-93) The C-Ratings are categorized from C-1, "fully combat ready" to C-4, "not combat ready". C-3 equates to a unit that is marginally combat ready and has severe deficiencies.

After the soldiers have been trained individually, the equipment distributed to the units the units are then evaluated to check their combat effectiveness. This tests the unit cohesion under simulated combat conditions to specific standards set forth in the Army Test and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The ARNG was able to report 95 percent of its units trained, equipped and maintained to C-3 standards or higher by the end of FY87, an increase of C-3 units by 36 percent between FY 85 to FY88. (16-18)

The record indicates that the ARNG has clearly proven that it is able to recruit, retain, train and maintain its personnel, equipment and units. Even with this impressive record and trend towards steady increased readiness there are still some critical questions that must be asked about the National Guard.

## CHAPTER IV

### CRITICAL QUESTIONS

As significant as the improvements have been and continue to be in the Guard, some critical questions must be addressed. There are those who say that the Guard has severe deficiencies and should not be given a greater role in our national defense because it will place the nation in a position of increased risk. The question maybe a moot point because our congress and people see a reduced threat which provides justification for a reduction in forces that could provide a cost savings to our government. The savings, the "peace dividend", would be applied against the federal deficit. Today the people of our country do not believe that a war in the near future is likely, therefore they do not feel they are at risk. The historical, logical and cultural reaction has been to resort to the "militia" with all of its attendant cost savings.

If that is the way we are going to go, and it appears that it is, then we need to do so fully informed with our eyes wide open, not hazed over with nostalgia of the passage of time. We must face up to some of the shortcomings we have in todays Guard.

One of the first criticisms is that the Army counts its soldiers fully MOS qualified when they return from AIT when in fact they are less than 100 percent trained. The light wheeled vehicle mechanics course only covers 29 percent of all the task required. The additional task are expected to be taught at the unit level after AIT. "This additional training would require 38 training days under the best of circumstances. This could be accomplished in approximately eight weeks on active duty, but would take Guardsman one full year." (17-11) That is a fair criticism. The Army has a standard for MOS qualification contained in the Soldier Manual for each MOS. This manual lists those tasks that have been determined to be essential for a soldier to be able to perform, or put another way, must be able to perform, to be considered combat effective. All soldiers should not be considered MOS qualified until they can pass that test to the standard. The net effect would be that initially readiness would fall for both components of the Army. The effect however would be much greater for the ARNG. As previously discussed if a soldier joined the ARNG six months before graduating from high school, then exercised the Split-Training-Option and could not be fully MOS qualified until one year after return from AIT he could spend two and one half years before counting as qualified for readiness reporting. The effect on a six year enlistment would be that the soldier would spend 42 percent of his enlistment non-MOS qualified. If the soldier were on a four year enlistment the

time would be 62.5 percent of his first enlistment non-MOS qualified. As great of an impact as this may be, it needs to be reported accurately. The criteria used to measure MOS qualified soldiers must be at what point can the soldier meet standard requirements that would cause him to be individually capable of performing his combat mission. At that point in time, and only at that time, count him so qualified.

The unit readiness is reported as a composite of five categories, personnel strength, MOS qualification, equipment assigned, equipment condition and unit training. Each category is assigned a C-rating, ranging from "fully combat ready", (C-1), to "not combat ready", (C-4). The units overall composite rating is normally the lowest of any one of the categories. Thus if all the categories were rated C-2 except unit training, and it were rated C-3, then the composite rating would be C-3. The unit commander however, does have the authority to make a subjective upgrade of the composite rating. If his unit is rated as C-3 because it is understrengthened he may subjectively upgrade it to C-2 because he feels that they are well trained, morale is high and his NCO's are above average. If all other factors are rated at C-2 objectively his composite score becomes C-2. There is much criticism of these readiness reports both from the active and the Guard side. "Some critics believe that training ratings have an optimistic bias, reflecting the reserve commanders 'can do' attitude as much as his units readiness". (18-16)

The Army War College conducted a survey of its students in 1976, all former commanders and found that 70 percent of them agreed that the reporting system did not reflect the true condition of their unit. The consensus was that "the whole system is held in disrepute by those most familiar with it." (26-185)

The reports provided to congress are categorized by those units that are C-3 and above. There is a vast difference between C-1 and C-3, but the data provided by the Army and DOD does not differentiate that difference. Many in the congress are now beginning to question the broad spread. What percentage are near the bottom? These are valid questions being asked by the people who are charged with funding a force to defend the citizens of the country. How can they make rational decisions if they are given data that is so general in nature as to be meaningless?

Answers to complex questions are often simple. Do not allow unit commanders to subjectively upgrade ratings. Even if the understrengthened unit has high morale and is well trained, the limits of how much terrain it can defend is fixed physically by how many there are of them. If we are playing a game with congress lets stop. Historically each time we have attempted to deceive them, we have only made short term gains. Once they realize we have duped them they react with a vengeance, they are suspect of everything we then tell them and the entire military establishment suffers



from loss of credibility. It is questionable whether we even gain in the short term. If we tell the congress exactly where we are at and why, would that not make the perfect argument for additional funds to increase our "real" combat readiness?

Time is the commodity that challenges the ARNG commander more than any other single training and readiness factor. Most of the shortcomings in training and readiness are a factor of time, specifically the shortage of it.

"Active units have significantly more training time available each year than do reserve components (161 days on the average for active units compared to 38-39 days for reserve components)..."

"One might assume that given equal amounts of equipment and personnel, active and reserve component units of the same type would have equal combat capability. However, the difference in training time between them generally results in a greater initial capability for the active unit." (19-18)

The above quote must be read very carefully, such words as "generally" and "initial capability" are very vague.

However the point is well taken. What then can be done?

Having been a National Guard attack helicopter battalion commander I can offer a few examples of how time is used. The battalions staff's primary job in peacetime is to plan and conduct training. The reality is that almost 50 percent of the staffs time is used to stand inspections or "entertaining" individual staff officers from higher headquarters. The unit stands the following events on an annual reoccurring basis, none were missed for the three years I commanded, or the previous fifteen I was in the unit in a lesser capacity. Each event was conducted on a separate

drill weekend, completely independent of the other inspection teams or staff visits. The events were: the Command Readiness Inspection, conducted by the IG Team; The Command Inspection, conducted by the next higher headquarters; the Command Logistical Readiness Team, conducted by an NGB Team; the Aviation Resource Management Survey, conducted by 4th US Army; and The Battalion Staff Proficiency Review Team, conducted by the State Headquarters. In addition we had an average of one individual staff officer each drill from a senior headquarters that needed to be "entertained" by his counterpart battalion staff officer.

Every area in the unit was inspected at least twice, usually using the same checklist. Aviation Supply was inspected by every single team, six inspections in one year. The supply people spent 50 percent of their drills standing inspections, leaving very little time to train or do any functional work, such as order aircraft repair parts.

Most of these inspections require some sort of follow up to be completed by the staff. The normal required action is to fix the discrepancy and reply by indorsement, (RBI) to the generating team of inspectors. Staff members spend additional time responding thus even less time is devoted to their primary duties of planning and conducting training for the battalion. The real question is "What are the hundreds of enlisted men doing while their training planners are spending the majority of their time standing and responding to inspectors?"

Over the years, there have been many Department of the Army and NGB level studies done to reduce the administrative workload of the ARNG commander, so that he can get on with his real job, training his unit. It does not appear that such studies have had much effect. The ultimate irony to this was during my last year as commander. We were standing one of the weekend long inspections when a major showed up from 4th Army and wanted to survey the staff and work with them for the weekend on how the Army could consolidate inspections and staff visits! The whole process is like a comedy, bad comedy.

Much of the time available (39 days per year) is used for administrative actions and not training. All of the administrative functions that an active unit does has to also be done by the ARNG unit. The Guardsman needs his periodic physical examination, MOS test, immunizations, personnel records checks and personal equipment inventories completed to name a few. On top of that the Army requires that all soldiers receive a class on such subjects as Geneva Convention Rights, Reemployment Rights of Guardsman if Activated and other such material.

The Army concludes in their study of unit training that the average active unit has 161 days per year devoted to unit training. That's after all administrative days, to include thirty days leave per soldier per year, have been subtracted out. (19-18) The Guardsman must accomplish that 161 days of training and all of the administration in 39 days! This is not a realistic approach.

There are several things that could be done to lower the administrative time and increase the training time. Those DA directed classes should be given as a post mobilization exercise. Almost all units are at least D+30 units, meaning they will not be deployed until 30 days after they are called up. Most will ship their equipment weeks before they leave to join it overseas. Would it not make more sense to give those briefings then? The troops have nothing else to do and it will be much fresher in their memory, not to mention relevant.

Many of the administrative hours could be recovered if the Guard would computerize their record keeping. The Army as a whole has done a less than splendid job in computerization. DA could not decide what they were going to buy and ended up buying several systems over the years that were not compatible. The units had WANG, the headquarters Zenith and the mainframe at the state headquarters was a Burroughs, none could talk to the other. This was solved in the previous four years by integrating everything into IBM compatible and flooding the units with Zenith. The only shortcoming is no one bought any software. Every supply room has a Zenith computer and printer, but lacking any software they continue to maintain a manual property book system. The same thing with all of the personnel records, computers on every desk, but they still keep the same manual records that have been kept for the past 50 years.

Given the proper full time manning and computerization much of the drill time spent on administration could be reduced. The full time manning comes into play because without it the unit must use Guardsmen on the weekend to perform many of the details that could have been completed during the month by mail by the full time manning.

Another poor utilization of time is "windshield time". Too much training time is used just getting to and from training areas.

"An Infantry battalion from Buffalo assembles at its armory at 7 p.m. on Friday night, drives to Fort Drum arriving at about 1 a.m. Saturday morning, falls out on its equipment at 8 a.m. Saturday, trains until 11 p.m. Saturday. The unit trains and prepares equipment for turn-in to the equipment concentration sight between 8 a.m. and 12 o'clock noon Sunday....[T]he unit must devote 12 out of 31 hours, or 38% of the time traveling. Other units traveling from NYC to Fort Dix...spend approximately 44 to 50% of their time traveling." (20-6)

Part of the solution is to do more of the training at home station, at the armory. All armories newly constructed are required to be on a minimum of five acres, room to build the armory, a storage building and enough space for at least small unit outside training task. The armory in the middle of the downtown with no outside space and the unit equipment kept sometimes hundreds of miles away is fast becoming a thing of the past. As previously mentioned many of the communities when competing to attract a Guard unit will give the Guard ten and twenty acres for the armory, free.

The armor community has seized on the state of the art technology for their M60A3 tanks. They have purchased simulators that are very similar to the type used to train pilots, an exact replica of the inside of the tank with complete simulation for combat, to include linking more than one tank together for team tactics. These simulators are even better than the range in that they do not have all of the administrative constraints associated with them. The simulator allows you to engage an enemy who shoots back and can "kill" you. The gunnery crew can shoot thousands of "rounds" at virtually no cost. The simulator is so good the tank crew can qualify on it, never having to actually fire a live round. The beauty of this system is that it fits into two semi trailers and can be transported from unit to unit. All of the armor units have had their armories retrofitted with concrete pads to accept the semi trailers. By staggering the drills in an armor battalion the simulators can be utilized by each company on a different drill.

This type of simulation is not out on the leading edge of technology. It readily available today, well developed and plentiful as a trip to any video arcade will quickly point out. It can be produced for a modest price and fielded in a timely manner. The other branches in the Army need to aggressively exploit this capability. NGB is committed to this type of training and is including it in the FY88-92 POM.(14-10)

Another means used to reduce administrative time during drills and give Guardsmen the opportunity to prepare training on other than drills is the use of Additional Training Assemblies. (ATA's) It was noted that "...those units having more than just 48 training assemblies available per year generally achieved much higher readiness ratings..." (21-52) When the unit has these ATA's allocated to them they may be used at the commanders discretion within regulatory guidelines. This allows certain key personnel to come in during the week in a paid status to accomplish administrative task and prepare training for the future drills. It is normally used by unit commanders, platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. This is not the answer for the entire unit but does give the cadre a chance to get ahead of the almost constant execution of drill.

Much thought has gone into extending the time spent training for the entire unit. Some units were used to conduct experiments by extending AT (Annual Training) from 15 days to 21. This seems to have a diminishing return in that of the 181,000 who left the reserve component in 1983, 61,000 cited "employer problems" and 60,000 indicated "spousal difficulties". (10-102) The dilemma and lesson seems to be that we must learn to train smarter, not longer. If the units were given terrain within thirty minutes of the armory, simulators and reduced administrative time we would have come a long way toward improving readiness and increasing retention.

Equipping the ARNG is fundamental to its combat capability. Much "lip service" has been given to the "One Army Policy", however, the bottom line is dollars, specifically lack thereof. As stated by the commander of an ARNG roundout battalion in the late 1970's "The higher ranking officers are throwbacks to WWII and the Korean conflict, clinging tenaciously to the shibboleth that reserve units and personnel are totally incompetent." (22-42) The attitude was due in part in the belief that all reserve components were trained on obsolete equipment. There was, and still is, some merit to that attitude. The ARNG has two sources of receiving equipment, hand-me-downs from the active Army or receive new material from the manufacturer.

The hand-me-down equipment may be first line material, often however it is older generation material that is being replaced by newer models. An example is when the Army bought newer M60A3 tanks it moved its older M60A1's into the Guard. When the Army began delivery of the newest tank, the M-1, it displaced M60A3's to the Guard.

The situation improved during the 1980's because of the larger budgets during the Reagan administration. As stated by one Army officer during that period "The regulars are skeptical and concerned, but no longer condescending and contemptuous." (23-1) However, even with the expanding budgets the ARNG did not receive its fair share. The old concerns and suspicions prevailed but to a lesser extent.



Congress was frustrated with the lethargy of the Army in distributing equipment to the Guard and thus directed that material be purchased specifically to fill the Guard units with new, current, state of the art first line equipment.

As the budgets began to decline in the latter 80's, predictably, so did the flow of equipment to the Guard. The Army announced in 1987 that it planned to reduce equipment buys in order to maintain force structure. (24-9) This slow down in buys resulted in not only a slow down in new equipment into the ARNG but less hand-me-downs. If the current force structure reductions take place, 30,000 for FY91, the resulting downsizing of the active force may mean that hand-me-downs at least will become more plentiful.

The Army has got to take off its parochial glasses when equipping the Guard. It must face the reality that half of its combat units are in the Guard and as the active force is reduced the Army will not be able to engage in even smaller operations before it must use the Guard. The units that are designated as round out must be equipped and trained right along with its parent active unit. This means Guard units must spend time training with their parent roundout organizations. This is beginning to happen in that the first deploying units are getting the new equipment first, but it is not happening on a large enough scale. Some early deploying Guard units have received new equipment before later deploying active units. These are steps in the right direction but during the budget cuts that are sure to come it

will probably take congressional oversight to assure that the Guard gets its fair share of distribution based on deployment dates. If the Army could adhere to the concept of "first to fight, first equipped" without prejudice a much more equitable distribution system would have occurred over the years.

To train and administer the personnel and maintain the equipment in a unit takes a full time work force. The force is a combination of Military Technicians (MT's) and Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) personnel. The composite of the two is referred to as Full Time Unit Support (FTUS). The FTUS has not been funded at the level required. The ARNG increased its FTUS to just over 29,000, an increase of 8 percent, in FY80. By FY 89 the force had been increased another 12 percent, however, this still left a shortfall of 15,872 spaces. The effect of filling FTUS spaces has been clearly demonstrated by the Air National Guard. It attributes its high state of readiness directly to the size of its FTUS, 30 percent of the unit strength as of FY87.(25-24) The ARNG has requested a FTUS force of 14 percent of the unit strength but has only been able to acquire 11 percent. The Air National Guard has been able to fill 91.7 percent of their authorized FTUS positions whereas the ARNG has only been able to fill 77.4 percent of its authorized FTUS positions. The lack of fill is certainly not for want of desire, but purely a function of budget. A false economy may be the result, for the dollars saved in wages is paid for in training, readiness and combat effectiveness.

These then are some of the major criticisms of increased responsibility for the Guard. Most of them have some merit, but many hold old prejudices that no longer can be substantiated. Some of the criticisms are caused by the Army itself, but all of them have solutions. There will be a cost to increase the readiness in the Guard, but it will still be more cost effective than the alternative, an active duty unit. We need then to study the choices or combinations of choices that are available to increase the effectiveness of the Guard.

## CHAPTER V

### OPTIONS AND CHOICES

What then are the options, what are the choices available to the Army and its relationship to the Guard? The Army could propose that it fold up the Guard and Reserve and use the money saved to equip and man additional active units.

It is doubtful this proposal would go very far for it flies in the face of historical precedent, would undoubtedly be challenged in the courts by the governors and is absolutely counter to what the current political trend is in the congress and the citizens of the country.

An attempt to dissolve the Guard would be an accusation that the Guard is not meeting the readiness requirements that the Army says it needs. Two questions immediately need to be answered. First, we have been telling the congress that the Guard has been meeting those stated requirements, why then the turn around? Second, if the Guard is not meeting those requirements it would be mostly a function of equipment distribution, new and hand-me-downs. Who did not distribute

that equipment to them? Can we argue that we need less tanks in the future or only that we may not need them on as short of notice. Everyone is of the opinion we still need the same number, if they are all on active duty no cost savings can be realized.

The most basic flaw to the concept of closing out the Guard or Reserve is that the resulting active force would have to be much smaller due to its cost. The Guard, even if it needs 30 to 60 days of training after mobilization to reach full combat readiness, offers depth in trained personnel. Once a small all active force was committed and if you had no Guard you would have no forces to replenish your committed forces with. The only source would be conscripts or volunteers that would have to be completely trained, Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training (AIT). Remember, AIT only trains them to about 30 percent of required task to be combat effective. Therefore the Guard is only 30 to 60 days from providing fully trained combat ready replacement units.

Another option would be to rely more on our allies, for NATO to "pay their fair share". As appealing as that may seem to Americans the world political realities never have supported it and seems to be moving further from that occurring at an increasing rate. A recent poll conducted by CNN in December 1989 found that over 80 percent of the Dutch and West Germans felt the Cold War was over and that military budgets should be substantially reduced. This would hardly seem the atmosphere to go to Bonn and propose that

they increase their military budget so that we may reduce ours. This attitude of our allies may not be fair but it is political reality.

We fair no better in the rest of the world. When the Persian Gulf was threatened the US Navy provided 90 percent of the combat ships used to escort the tankers through the Straits of Hormuz. Over 70 percent of the oil being escorted was destined for Japan and Western Europe. Where were they? Right or wrong it appears that US military forces will be expected to be a world military force and that the allies are with us in spirit, but a little behind us in financial support.

The reality of the budget has arrived. The congress may be a few years ahead of the actual reduction of the threat as previously discussed, however, while the physical presence of the threat may still be there, it has certainly been politically changed. When we compute the combat power of the Warsaw Pact we historically included all of the Eastern European countries. How much of a threat is Poland or Hungary to NATO today? It is difficult to conjure up a scenario where the Warsaw Pact would turn on the West with any significant military effect or resolve.

In many cases the threat has been geographically relocated. The USSR has pulled back tactically important bridging units to the Soviet interior. This has not decreased capability, the units still exist, but it has increased warning time. There are many today who feel that

it would take the Warsaw Pact 30 to 60 days to mobilize for an offense against Western Europe. Those same 30 to 60 days could be used to bring the Guard units up to full combat readiness.

Even with increased warning times those Guard units that are short of equipment will not be able to reach full capability. There are no magic warehouses out there full of equipment other than the POMCUS stocks in Europe. If we are going to reduce the active force and increase the responsibility of the Guard we must then equip it accordingly. Once mobilization begins almost anything not already produced will not be available.

If we are going to put this responsibility in the Guard then we must also bring up the full time manning levels to those needed to train and maintain the force and its equipment on a day to day basis.

The American citizens have demonstrated their willingness to support the "militia" for over three centuries, communities and governors compete to have Guard units in their environments. The Guard has demonstrated that it can man itself, even in the all volunteer environment.

If the congress is going to reduce the active force, but retain the national resolve as a true world military power it will have to use the Army National Guard. However, the Army and the National Guard can not then play the shell game they have in the past. More than lip service will have to be paid to the Guard, the Army must come to the full

realization that the Guard is part of their Army and that they can no longer fight without it. The scale of the conflict the Army would be able to wage by itself would be correspondingly reduced. If the Army plans to win, then it must put the same attention, equipment, and care into the Guard as it does the active force.

All things considered the nation can place more of its military strength and responsibility into the Army National Guard with out substantially increasing the risk to the American citizen. The "New Guard" must be better equipped, manned and trained to reduce that risk. The "New Guard" cannot be treated like a step child, it must be a fully integrated partner in the "One Army".

The political and fiscal reality is that this will be the only option and choice this nation has. It is time to embrace the concept and use our energy to give the citizens every cent of protection he deserves for tax dollar spent. However, defense will never be free.



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